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PT Cipta Perdana Lancar Tbk

PT Cipta Perdana Lancar is a founder-controlled Indonesian metal-stamping manufacturer supplying vehicle, electronics and household components from one Tangerang factory — profitable and fast-growing, but small, bank-funded, and thin on cash.

Two years after its $0.0065 listing, the shares round-tripped — up to a $0.0128 close in February 2026, down to a $0.0038 close in June, and back near $0.0059 — a path driven more by a thin float than by the business.
$0.0059
Share price
$16.3M
Market value
$22.2M
FY2025 revenue
74.4%
Family-owned
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The statements

Five years of statements: revenue nearly tripled, cash nearly vanished

FY2021 → FY2025as reported · $
Revenue$22M+34%
Operating margin11.0%−0.7pp
Net income$2M+26%
EPS$0.00+10%
Open the full statements →
As reported, FY2021–FY2025; margins are a contract manufacturer's steady signature.
  • Revenue. Net sales climbed from $9.1M in FY2021 to $22.2M in FY2025 — up 38% in the latest year alone, and roughly 55% over the last two.
  • Margins. Net margin has held in a 7–9% band for four years and operating margin near 11%; steel cost passes through to price rather than being absorbed.
  • The catch. FY2025 profit reached $1.81M, but only about half turned to cash, and the year-end balance fell to $0.17M from $3.4M a year earlier.
EPS falls across the years on a larger post-IPO share count, not weaker earnings; absolute profit is the honest scorecard.
Where growth came from

Most of FY2025's growth came from a single government order

FY2025 revenue growth, by source ($M)
Of the $6.1M added in FY2025, 61% came from one new line.
  • One buyer. PART's new metal-household segment ($3.7m, 61% of FY2025 revenue growth) is one government customer, Badan Gizi Nasional, whose FY2025 order matches the segment total to the dollar and carries no contracted recurrence.
  • What rides on it. That $3.7M is 16.8% of FY2025 revenue, from an account that sold nothing before 2025; on a bear path where it reverts to ~$0.3M, revenue falls to ~$20.2M and profit to ~$1.4M.
  • The other read. Management describes the food-tray business as continuous rather than tender-based, and the kitchen network it supplies is still expanding — a general business-model statement, not a documented commitment that this order repeats.
The core risk

The bear case and the refinancing wall are one event

$1.45M
Bank debt due within a year
$0.17M
Cash on handcovers 12%
$2.53M
Finished goodsno obsolescence reserve
  • One correlated event. The bear case and the refinancing wall are one event: a FY2026 in which the Badan Gizi order does not recur is also the year the $2.53m inventory does not convert, even as ~$1.45m of BCA debt matures against $0.17m of cash.
  • Why they are linked. The same government order drives both the revenue at risk — 16.8% of sales — and the $2.53M of finished goods, about 23% of equity, carried at full cost.
  • The bound. The founder personally guarantees the full BCA facility on family land, and the bank has rolled and expanded the lines before, so the risk is bounded by the controller's own wealth, not net cash.
Cash and solvency

Profit is real, but only about half of it turns to cash

Net profit vs operating cash flow ($M)
Cash conversion fell from 1.6× in FY2023 to 0.51× in FY2025.
  • Half turns to cash. FY2025's $1.81M of profit produced just $0.93M of operating cash — a 0.51× conversion — as inventory doubled to $3.7M, most of it finished goods.
  • Cushion spent. The July 2024 IPO left $3.4M of cash; eighteen months and $4.3M of capex later, $0.17M remained. Free cash flow has been negative three years running.
  • Reads two ways. The $2.53M finished-goods build is benign if it ships in 2026, a write-down risk if demand softened — the first line to watch in the next audited accounts.
The debt stack

Every dollar of debt sits with one bank, guaranteed by the founder

BCA facilities and maturities
FacilityPurposeMaturityRate
Local credit ($0.9M)Working capitalJun 20269.25%
Revolver ($0.9M)ReceivablesJun 20269.00%
Investment creditDies & machines2027–20318.0–8.4%
Investment creditLand & buildings2030–20338.0%
Total bank debt $7.4M — moderate at ~2.0× EBITDA, but from a single lender.
  • One bank. Every facility is with BCA — no second lender, no bond — secured on land, machinery and receivables, and personally guaranteed by founder-CEO Hamim.
  • The near-term wall. Two $0.9M working-capital lines both mature in June 2026; renewal on similar terms is what keeps the single-lender relationship intact.
  • Termed-out core. The investment credits funding dies, machines and buildings run to 2030–2033 at 8–9%, so the maturity ladder itself is manageable.
Ownership

A genuine founder company — with the control that comes with it

Share ownership
The founding family controls 74.4%; the public float is 25.6%.
  • Skin in the game. The family owns 74.4%, and founder-CEO Hamim personally guarantees every dollar of BCA debt on family land — the strongest alignment fact in the filings.
  • Restrained take. Board pay is 9.3% of profit with no equity plan, dividends are pro-rata, and pre-IPO affiliate funding has been wound down to near zero.
  • The flip side. A 25.6% float cannot block or outvote anything; a January 2026 meeting authorised the board to pledge substantially all assets. The check is incentives, not structure.
Demand and durability

Fast growth against a flat market — a share-and-diversification story

Revenue by segment ($M)
Indonesia's motorcycle market is flat near 6.4m units; growth came from share and one new line.
  • Flat pool, share gains. Motorcycle sales held near 6.4m units in 2025, barely changed from 2023, yet PART grew revenue ~55% over two years — a share-and-diversification story, not a rising tide.
  • Automotive is still the core. The automotive franchise supplied 80% of FY2025 sales and grew 15%; it sits on a deep replacement-parts pool and is largely insulated from the sub-1% EV transition.
  • The new leg is unproven. Two-thirds of the year's growth came from a household line with no track record, sold into kitchenware and fryer markets where PART has no established position.
Earnings quality

Profit grew on volume, and every margin line thinned

Gross margin by quarter, FY2025
Q4 was 39.5% of the year's revenue at the lowest margin of the four — 16.8%.
  • Volume, not pricing. FY2025 profit rose 30%, but gross margin fell from 21.9% to 19.2% and net from 8.7% to 8.2%. The step-up was volume through near-fixed cost, not better unit economics.
  • Back-loaded. The fourth quarter alone was 39.5% of the year's revenue at the lowest gross margin, 16.8% — the government order landed almost entirely in the second half.
  • A quieter offset. Roughly 23% of pre-tax profit came from recurring scrap sales rather than making parts, and the segment note allocates cost pro-rata, hiding the order's true margin.
Scale vs peer

The nearest listed peer is 16× larger and far more cash-generative

PART vs Dharma Polimetal (DRMA), FY2025
MetricPARTDRMA
Revenue ($M)22.2356
Net profit ($M)1.8139.9
Gross margin19.2%18.0%
ROE16.3%20.9%
Cash conversion (CFO/NI)0.51×1.39×
At the stamping operation PART holds its own on margin; the gap opens on cash and scale.
  • Holds its own on margin. PART's 19.2% gross margin edges DRMA's 18.0%, so the small company competes on price and cost at the level of the stamping line itself.
  • The gap is cash. DRMA — itself one of PART's customers — turned $39.9M of profit into $55.4M of cash (1.39×) against PART's 0.51×, evidence that PART's cash problem is company-specific.
  • No structural moat. PART is a sub-scale tier supplier of commodity stamped metal; its edge is execution and proximity, not pricing power.
Valuation

Back near its IPO price, but not a discount to its peers

9.6×
Trailing P/Etop of peer range
1.6×
Price / book
5.6×
EV / EBITDA
1.6%
Dividend yieldpeers 7–8%
  • Full, not cheap. At $0.0059 the stock trades at 9.6× earnings — above Astra Otoparts (~5.8×) and its closest analog Dharma Polimetal (~7.0×), level with the highest-quality name Selamat Sempurna (~9.0×).
  • Same book, lower return. PART and DRMA both trade at 1.6× book, but DRMA earns 20.9% on that book against PART's 16.3% — paying the same multiple for a lower-returning, cash-shorter business.
  • Thin income. The 1.6% yield sits well below peers at 7–8%, because the cash is committed to working capital and the BCA facility.
Scenarios

At $0.0059, cheap only if the government order recurs

FY2026 P/E at $0.0059, by scenario
Illustrative, not forecasts: the scenarios differ almost entirely on the household line.
  • Bear. If the fit-out was one-time, revenue falls ~9% to ~$20.2M and profit to ~$1.4M, making the same $0.0059 a 12.6× multiple on a shrinking base — the opposite of a value entry.
  • Base and bull. Partial recurrence holds revenue near $22.1M (~10×); a scaling franchise lifts it to ~$26.6M and ~$2.4M profit, near 7×, with cash conversion normalising as capex tapers.
  • The pivots. Two FY2026 disclosures decide it: whether Badan Gizi reappears in Note 24, and whether operating cash returns toward 1.0× of profit.
Price

A round-trip from $0.0065 to $0.0128 and back, on a thin float

Listed at $0.0065 in July 2024; back near $0.0059 two years on.
  • Volatility, not re-rating. On a 25.6% float the shares ran to a $0.0128 close in February 2026 and fell to $0.0038 in June before settling near $0.0059 — micro-cap price behaviour, not fundamentals.
  • Not automatically cheap. A price back at the IPO level is cheap only if the business is worth more than at listing; here that turns on the order's durability and the balance sheet behind it.
  • No coverage. No sell-side analyst follows PART and there is no published consensus; the forward view has to be built from its own record and capacity.
What to watch

A founder-aligned micro-cap that looks cheap — if one government order recurs and one bank keeps lending

Read the full report →

This distills a guided study of PT Cipta Perdana Lancar, built chapter by chapter from its filings.

Compiled from the full report · 2026-07-19 · For information, not investment advice.