Chapter 2

Cash and Solvency

Figures converted from Indonesian rupiah at historical FX rates — see data/company.json.fx_rates for the rate table. Ratios, margins, and multiples are unitless and unchanged.

Across FY2023–FY2025, PT Cipta Perdana Lancar grew revenue 55% and net profit 89%, yet converted only about half of recent profit into operating cash and spent more on plant than it earned in every one of those years. The July 2024 IPO handed it a $3.4 million cash cushion; eighteen months later $0.17 million was left. The business rests on $7.4 million of bank debt from a single lender, secured on its machinery and personally guaranteed by the founder.

Three years of financials

The income statement reads well. Revenue rose from $15.5 million in FY2023 to $22.2 million in FY2025 [1], a 38% jump in the latest year alone. Operating profit climbed to $2.4 million and net profit to $1.8 million [2]. Net margin has held in a narrow 6.7%–8.9% band for four years — the steady signature of a contract manufacturer that passes steel cost through to price.

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Statements of Profit or Loss [3]; pre-FY2024 figures as reported in the 2024 IPO Prospektus.

One caution on per-share figures: the share count is not comparable across the listing. The company carried 51 million shares at end-2023, split the Rp1,000 par value to Rp25, and issued IPO stock — leaving 2.72 billion shares by end-2024 [4]. Reported earnings per share therefore fall from Rp25.67 in FY2023 to about Rp11 in FY2025 purely on the larger base; absolute profit, not EPS, is the honest scorecard here.

Source: FY2025 Annual Report [5]; pre-FY2024 figures as reported in the 2024 IPO Prospektus.

A quieter feature of the profit is worth naming. Of $2.33 million of pre-tax profit in FY2025, $0.55 million — 23% — came from scrap sales booked as other income, roughly the same $0.60 million earned the year before [6]. For a metal stamper, offcut scrap is genuinely recurring, so this is not a one-off dressing up the year; but it is a non-core line that has stopped growing while revenue rose 38%, and it happens to offset most of the $0.67 million finance cost [7]. Strip it out and pre-tax profit from making parts is closer to $1.78 million.

Profit that only half-turns to cash

The gap between reported profit and cash generated is the more important story, and it has widened. In FY2023 the company turned $1.04 million of net profit into $1.66 million of operating cash — a healthy 1.6 times [8]. In FY2024 and FY2025 that ratio collapsed to 0.60 and 0.51: operating cash flow of $0.86 million and $0.93 million against net profit of $1.44 million and $1.81 million [9].

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Statements of Cash Flows [10]; FY2023 from FY2024 Annual Report [11].

The mechanism is inventory, not an accounting trick. Depreciation of $1.10 million [12] should lift operating cash above profit; instead, total inventory doubled from $1.91 million to $3.73 million during FY2025, an outflow of $1.88 million that absorbs the entire depreciation add-back and more [13]. Almost all of it is finished goods, which jumped nearly nine-fold from $0.30 million to $2.53 million [14]. Management booked no obsolescence provision against it [15].

That build has two readings, and the evidence does not yet settle between them. Finished goods staged for known early-2026 deliveries would be a benign working-capital timing effect; goods produced ahead of demand that softened would be the start of a write-down risk. The first-quarter 2026 revenue run-rate of about $5.3 million, reported after year-end, annualises close to the FY2025 level and leans toward the benign reading — but a finished-goods position this large, carried at full cost, is the first line a skeptic should watch in the next audited accounts.

The IPO cushion, spent in a year

Once capital spending is included, the company has not funded itself from operations in any of the last three years. Free cash flow — operating cash less capital expenditure — was negative $1.53 million in FY2023, negative $1.10 million in FY2024, and negative $3.39 million in FY2025, as capex ran to $4.3 million in the latest year against $0.93 million of operating cash [16]. Cumulatively, the three years consumed roughly $6 million of cash beyond what operations produced.

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Statements of Cash Flows [17]; FY2023 from FY2024 Annual Report [18].

The July 2024 IPO raised $4.4 million of primary capital and briefly changed the picture: cash on the balance sheet went from $0.05 million at end-2023 to $3.42 million at end-2024 [19]. That cushion was not durable. At end-2024, $3.35 million of the $3.42 million sat in a single Bank Victoria account — the parked IPO proceeds — and by end-2025 that account was empty, leaving $0.17 million spread across small operating balances [20]. Management confirmed the proceeds were fully deployed on capex and operations by 31 March 2025 [21]. In effect, one year of expansion absorbed the entire equity raise.

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Note 4 [22]; pre-FY2024 balances as reported in the 2024 IPO Prospektus.

A single-lender debt stack

The financing that fills the gap deserves a closer look than the headline leverage ratio suggests. Total bank debt was $7.4 million at end-2025, up from $7.2 million a year earlier — a figure that includes a $0.14 million short-term loan and $1.3 million of long-term debt maturing within twelve months, on top of the $6.0 million long-term portion [23]. Against $3.5 million of EBITDA (operating profit plus depreciation), net bank debt of about $7.2 million is roughly 2.0 times — moderate on its own, and covered a little over 5 times at the EBITDA line and 3.7 times at operating profit by the $0.67 million interest bill.

Three features make the structure more concentrated than those ratios imply. Every facility is with one bank, PT Bank Central Asia; there is no second lender and no bond [24]. The loans are secured on the company's land, machinery (a minimum $2.6 million list) and trade receivables (a minimum $0.6 million), and carry a personal guarantee from founder-CEO Hamim up to the full facility limit [25]. And BCA imposes affirmative covenants: a range of corporate actions require the bank's written consent [26]. The founder's personal guarantee is a genuine alignment signal — his own assets are on the line — but it also means the entire capital structure rests on one lender's continued comfort with one family.

The maturity ladder itself is manageable. Most of the investment credits — funding dies, machines, land and factory buildings at 8%–9% — are termed out to 2030–2033 [27]. The near-term pressure sits in two $0.9 million working-capital lines — a local credit and a receivables-financing revolver — both maturing 12 June 2026 [28]. BCA has rolled and expanded these facilities before, most recently amending the agreement in June 2025 [29].

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Note 14 Bank Loans [30].

Reading the solvency risk

For a reader whose first priority is a near-zero chance of bankruptcy, the picture is genuinely two-sided, and precision matters more than a label.

On the reassuring side, current assets of $6.55 million cover current liabilities of $2.67 million 2.45 times, the equity base of $11.1 million is larger than total liabilities of $9.05 million [31], and the debt is long-dated, asset-backed and cheap [32]. Interest is covered comfortably from operating profit, and the founder's personal guarantee gives the lender a reason, and the borrower every incentive, to keep the relationship intact.

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Notes 4 and 14 [33] [34].

On the exposed side, the cash buffer is thin against near-dated obligations. About $1.45 million of bank debt matures within twelve months, and cash of $0.17 million covers only 12% of it [35]. The comfortable current ratio depends on realising $3.73 million of inventory — most of it finished goods carried at full cost with no obsolescence reserve — and roughly $1.8 million of receivables into cash on schedule [36]. With operations not self-funding and the equity raise spent, the company depends on BCA continuing to roll the June-2026 working-capital lines and to fund the next capex cycle.

The balanced read: this is not a business on the edge of default — leverage is moderate, maturities are laddered, and the founder is personally committed. But it is a business with almost no liquidity margin of safety, one whose solvency runs through a single bank relationship and through the timely conversion of a swollen inventory. The condition that would move this from "watch" to "worry" is concrete: a stall in the June-2026 refinancing, or an inventory write-down that dents both earnings and the collateral base at once.

The forward view, without a consensus

No sell-side analyst covers PART. Yahoo Finance, Simply Wall St and Investing.com each show zero estimates and no price target, so there is no consensus to lean on — the forward view has to be built from the company's own record and capacity. First-quarter 2026 revenue came in around $5.3 million; annualised, that is close to the FY2025 pace and points to growth in the high-single to low-double digits rather than a step-change, unless the new metal food-tray line scales faster than the base.

Management's own forward framing calibrates how much optimism to apply. At the June 2025 Public Expose, the company engaged publicly with a $60 million revenue target for 2025 and set aside $3.0–4.2 million of capex — funded from cash and bank loans — to pursue it [37]. Actual FY2025 revenue was $22.2 million, less than 40% of that figure [38]. The capex guidance proved accurate — $4.3 million was spent — but the revenue ambition missed by a wide margin. A reader building a base case should discount management's top-line aspirations heavily and anchor instead on the demonstrated run-rate and the capacity that heavy capex is adding.

The reasonable base case, then: mid-teens revenue growth off the FY2025 base as new capacity fills, margins steady near 8%, continued capex in the $3.0–4.2 million range, and — the load-bearing consequence — free cash flow that stays negative and a balance sheet that keeps leaning on BCA until operating cash catches up with the investment programme. When capital spending normalises toward maintenance levels, the same operating cash could turn free cash flow positive quickly; that inflection, not the reported profit line, is what a value buyer here is really underwriting.

What would change the read

Three line items, each checkable in the next audited accounts, decide whether the fragility eases or hardens:

• The June-2026 refinancing. Renewal of the two $0.9 million BCA working-capital lines on similar terms confirms the single-lender relationship holds; any tightening or non-renewal is the fastest route to stress [39].
• The finished-goods inventory. A drawdown of the $2.53 million finished-goods balance into cash validates the benign reading; a further build, or a first obsolescence provision, validates the bearish one [40].
• Capex versus operating cash. The year capex falls back toward the $1.1 million depreciation run-rate while operating cash holds is the year free cash flow turns positive and the reliance on debt ends [41].

The financials that satisfy this report's required questions ([sec-00013], [sec-00014], [sec-00019]) therefore land on a single tension: a profitable, fast-growing operation whose reported earnings are real but whose cash is fully committed to growth and whose safety depends on one bank and one inventory conversion. Whether that clears a margin-of-safety bar is a question the valuation and industry chapters have to answer against the price.